Hermetologia #2

Para fazer sentido é preciso haver sentido(s). Onipresença comunicacional desgasta a efetividade da realidade. O atual se torna o atual(izado). Assim, as comunicações perdem seu tele(aspecto): a distância se reduz, o campo se espreme (mas não se exprime) inteiramente no local, toda abertura se fecha. Impressão de (des)velamento – só há Maya, só há véu, ∴ samsara ≍ nirvana. Isso, certamente, deve-se, em parte, à impossibilidade de resistir à proximidade. Distância para amenizar o insuportável. Ubiquidade comunicacional acarreta transparência opaca. Se fosse possível se comunicar, não haveria (necessidade de) comunicação (∴ menos comunicação ≅ mais comunicação?). A parte difícil é encontrar o que há de comum no em comum para comunicar.

Serial Musings #6

Just like Chris Angelis commented in the last entry of this series, here we are trying to find a solution that is neither Hegelian nor Deleuzian, but one of the best of both. Deleuze, most probably influenced by Pierre Macherey's book Hegel or Spinoza, preferred the second to the first, thus losing great developments in his theory.

The central idea is that there is a passage from pure differentiation to de-differentiation, thus generating what we usually understand by identity. But it is important to note the nuanced change: identity no longer means strict and unchangeable equality, but a threshold of indifference.

As indifference simply means differentiation of so little intensity that it does not cross any threshold of differentiation, it is nothing more than a pronounced de-differentiation, that is, a lessening of differentiation intensity.

But, as can be seen, lesser intensity differentiation means less(er) difference(s).

Thus, identity stability generated by the increase in de-differentiation from differentiation leads to an accumulation of indifference.

Hence, as we said a few entries back, it is a function of consideration.

This means: there is a threshold that must be crossed if it is to be taken into consideration as differentiated.

Thus, as Chris Angelis questioned: what is the difference – within, inherent – between two atoms of hydrogen? We can answer with a resounding: none. Not because, in fact, there is no difference, but because more differentiation, that is, differentiation of greater intensity, would be necessary for them to be considered as effectively different from each other.

MitoLógicas #1

Doze teses sobre a ficção atualmente

Traduzidas por Igor da Silva Livramento

Originalmente por R. M. Berry e Jeffrey R. Di Leo

1. O presente da ficção é a intersecção de tudo o que a ficção tem sido e tudo aquilo em que se tornará.Formas de escrita e de leitura já estão sempre ligadas aos seus desenvolvimentos e tradições históricas, no entanto, são continuamente arrastadas para um futuro repleto de possibilidades. Poderíamos até dizer que a mudança e a temporalidade são as constantes no presente da ficção, uma caracterização que nos deixa perplexos com a própria palavra “presente”. Em comparação com o longo passado da ficção e seu futuro aberto, o presente parece relativamente breve e instável, com quase qualquer durabilidade, mas isso não diminui seu valor. Pelo contrário, o valor pode muito bem não existir em qualquer outro lugar. Isto é, se a ficção ainda tiver significado para nós, então terá necessariamente agora, no presente, todo outro significado sendo latente ou potencial. Por outras palavras, o transitório, irrealizável presente pode simplesmente nomear a condição de existência contínua da ficção, distinguindo-a de tudo o que, como o épico, tem apenas um passado ou, como a justiça, apenas um futuro. Como o espaço elusivo onde o passado encontra os nossos sonhos e desejos, o presente da ficção estende a promessa de mudança a todos os que a sofreriam.

Hermetologia #1

A crítica conclui, isto é, dá-nos a certeza de que a crítica é absolutamente irrefreável. Em outras palavras: é impossível evitar interpretação. O mero fato de haver interpretação põe um resto (ou seja, fundamento) ininterpretável. Daí se compreende que o segredo não se divide em revelação e manifestação, ou seja, verdade e comunicação. O segredo é segredar. O enigma é enigmático. Assim a crítica, isto é, o segredo, o mistério, o enigma, é o silêncio do qual emerge, e para o qual retorna, toda linguagem. Jaz aquém (além): é absolutamente indizível (e impensável, e irrepresentável, e…). Só sabemos que (não)existe porque (não)podemos (não)senti-lo daqui.

Serial Musings #5

In order to avoid an infinite regress, we can think of a differentiation threshold which the crossing of generates an exhaustion of differentiating and keeps the intensity of (further) differentiation at bay (within a(nother) threshold). Individuation, for example, would work like this.

In other words, differentiation would differentiate from previous differentiation with such intensity that it would separate itself from previous differentiation and would individuate itself in a more or less stable manner, since it would begin to differentiate (further) at low(er) intensity differentiation, exhausted by crossing the differentiation threshold (that led to individuation and stabilization, that is lower intensity).

If we look closely, there is a dangerously fun similarity here between an operation and its dual. That is, differentiation would be the fundamental operation, but an operation carries with it its dual (if we are understanding the results of category theory correctly, this time about adjunction), so differentiation and de-differentiation – that is, stabilization, (towards) identity – are both operative.

This assures us that there are turtles differentiations only almost all the way down, as it is self-hosting and bootstrapping.

In other words: the process stops and rests on a dynamic stability between differentiation and de-differentiation. In a sense, we can say that it is the dynamics between differentiation and de-differentiation that ensure the (relative) stabilization of the (universal) process(es) – all the while sustaining the dynamism necessary to start the process(es).

This reminds me of a sentence by a great professor I had during undergrad: "where there is a force, there is a counterforce".

In this sense, differentiation does not differentiate from itself enough to become pure identitary stability, because alongside de-differentiation there is always the stabilization of difference qua difference, difference (as) itself.

Seria Musings #4

Let us begin by making an addendum to the third entry in this series of posts: the thresholds pertaining to each identity being unique on a case by case basis is not something bad, on the contrary, it is good, because it is a guarantee that two things will only be the same if they are, in fact, one and the same thing. This can be backwards posited with a threshold to determine the notion of equality or identity. (In this way, the very notion of identity or equality itself can be defined.)

Now, continuing our topic: on Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, fifth item, Wittgenstein says that: "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)"

Therefore, it seems we are pursuing a more or less accurate trail. There must be, then, some approximation between a logic of becoming, a logic of being, category theory and, perhaps, because it seems to approach category theory, a type theory. But to account for this multiple approach, we would need a mathematical finesse that does not belong here.

It is important to note that a process-based approach will not hinder the emergence of emergent structures.

In this way it is possible to stipulate a rich and complex reality without ignoring the explanatory advances of the sciences, avoiding patently unreasonable eliminativism and reductionism, yet parsimoniously giving an account only of what in fact exists, without a useless ontological anarchic proliferation. Thus, for example, the intentionality of conscious experience can be composed as a fitting of functions that are irreducible to each other.

According to field theory, as well as the gunk nature of time (i.e., something infinitely divisible), it seems that reality is based on interactions. The interpretative key here is in the gunk nature of time: continuous in such a way that it can be infinitely divisible, but for all practical purposes it reaches a threshold which, for us, is small enough, that is, it suffices. (To understand the gunk nature, think of the real number line: we can zoom indefinitely and the results keep showing up.) Making yet another analogy: the point (in the sense of Euclidean geometry) would be only a regional compacting whose threshold is infinitely small.

So, to follow the line of reasoning that is emerging here, we would say that identity (in a sense similar to the strict sense of mathematical equality) is only a case of similarity whose threshold is sufficiently restricted (perhaps infinitely restricted); and, more appropriately and more generally: identity is a differentiation of null (or at least negligible) intensity. To add another analogy: it would be like considering silence as just null intensity sound.

Thus, we do not need to give in to the onticological principle (i.e. there is no difference that does not make a difference, viz., every difference makes a difference) nor, in a broader sense, to flat ontologies (which, most often, are patently false) – simply because there are affectation thresholds: not everything will always affect everything else. In this way we are preserving hierarchized ontologies without, however, establishing concepts with unnecessary internal constraints. We gain flexibility and possibility without losing scientificity.

Moreover, if we wanted to be Humeans to the fullest, we could establish reality itself as based on varying ranges of thresholds of possibilities of existence. It would be an easy way out and would make reality in itself inductive, but it remains – forgive the pun – a possibility (of explanation).

Serial Musings #3

I may be biting my tongue when I say this, but the emphasis on morphisms in category theory seems to be an interesting way to formalize this, especially as it is a function-oriented theory, which are processes applied to objects.

The difficulty here is to get rid of dependence on objects, or at least to be able to redefine them in a way that favours the flow of processes rather than static conceptions of immutable blocks of characteristics. Even so, some conception of identity is necessary, not as a timeless permanence or immutability, but as a transformation of oneself (in)to oneself over (some) time (period).

It seems to me that there is an interpretation of predicate logic in which predicates are as applications of functions over the subjects to which they apply. I may be wrong on this one, I honestly do not know.

In this way, we may attempt to define any entity as a nullary function that always returns the codified entity. Identity would be a singulary function on that entity that returns the entity itself, enabling the codification of time-dependent transformations. And if we start to consider time, we can make identity a binary function that depends on the time interval under consideration (or even ternary to account for the initial and final time interval under consideration).

It is important to stress that a process-oriented theory will fundamentally depend on time, but this does not betray our basic intuition: thinking depends on time, so it is no problem to keep operating with an underdefined concept of time. Especially because the difference between thinking and the thing thought is immanent in thinking itself, therefore, with the passage of time, corrections can be made, and we can achieve a better-defined concept of time (if not at least asymptotically).

The main problem to be faced by identity as function is the Humean problem of induction. Put simply, this is the impossibility of being sure about inductions, because things do not necessarily have to remain as they are. We can be convinced that they will be as they are – as formulated in Carnap's masterly book on probability – but to be convinced is not the same as to be certain (of the future).

Here comes into play the rigid designators explored by analytical philosophers (notably by Kripke). It seems that these do not depend on an immutable essence to maintain the link from name to thing (a link which, as we stated above, is internal to thought); rather, it seems these designators must only respect a threshold of (i)mutability.

How to determine this limit seems to be a specialized issue in each case (that is to say, a different threshold for each designator).

However, the proposal is made. Somehow, solving the problem of induction seems to lead to the resolution of the difficulties with the use of identities, or in other words, solving the problem of induction will free the notion of identity from the clutches of essentialisms.

Another aspect that seems to be essential: getting rid of geometric axiomatic based on the dot. Being able to develop spatial reasoning independent of the identification caused by the notion of dot will provide reasoning closer to the intuition of thresholds needed here.

Perhaps the notion of region, or space, or field, or environment, or something similar to these notions, is sufficient to formulate an expanded conception of identity that is independent of rigid equality. Here once again we are touching on the union between category theory and a functional approach: two morphisms are equal when their results are equal, even if the transformations operated in each one/by each one are different. It is something like a pragmatic equality, perhaps more appropriately called equivalence (literally: same value (at the end of the process)).

This resolution may betray our self-perception, it may hurt our ego, our pride, the feeling we have of ourselves, but it is not wrong just because of that.

The notion of an identity function (of oneself to oneself) is curiously similar to the notion of a bundle of perceptions from empiricism. A crucial point of divergence between the two proposals lies in the threshold of (i)mutability from which a bundle of perceptions ceases to be what it was and becomes another one. Would this be something similar to the passage from woman to mother? We do not know how to answer this for the time being, but the reflection is certainly valid, if not necessary.

Serial Musings #2

For this second entry in the series, I would like to address an issue that puzzles me from the first time I came into contact with it: ontologies need not depend on objects, they can be process-oriented and function-oriented.

Reality, existence itself, seems to be time-dependent.

Even if it is a thought, which will need to take body somewhere, but is not necessarily located there, therefore independent of space, it will still need to exist temporally, that is, throughout its duration, whatever it may be.

Existence, therefore, is not a static characteristic of an object, but a time-dependent function (of consideration).

On the one hand, this allows ontologies to embed their own meta-theories; on the other hand, it allows self-hosting and bootstrapping. Thus, ontologies will depend much less on adjacent and auxiliary disciplines, and will still benefit from formal advances that deeply concern meta-theories.

Perhaps we may even call the classical ones "object-centered ontologies", not to confuse them with the contemporary "much ado for nothing" object-oriented ontology (I am unsure if it is permissible to pluralize it – but I am sure of what I read and it is weak).

For the time being, it is better to explore ways of formalizing this. The next entry in this series will deal with the first step towards this formalization.